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More than a hundred years ago Great Britain recognized in specific legislation
that provision for old age through individual saving presented difficulties. In a
statute enacted in 1833,1 the British Parliament initiated a policy of offering old-age
annuities through the National Debt Commissioner to persons who desired to make
systematic preparation for income during their retirement period. Belgium, France
and Italy2 enacted similar laws in the fifties. These measures had little practical
result as the opportunities for purchase of old-age annuities secured by the public
credit were not taken advantage of by appreciable numbers.
'More effective, of course, were the compulsory annuity arrangements set up in
the latter half of the nineteenth century by various European countries3 for workers
in selected industries, such as mining, navigation and later, railroading. In the case
of mining, these schemes were but public organization on a compulsory basis of
provident.funds which provided accident and sickness insurance as well as old age
protection. These funds dated back to the early middle ages and had always been,
by virtue of custom more effective than any formal law, a required part of organized
community life in mining villages.4
In point of time of origin the French Seamen's Invalidity and Old Age Insurance
Fund commands special attention. It was established in 16731 and, barring oc-
casional interruptions during periods of violent political change, continuously func-
tioned thereafter. It was moreover not only the first compulsory insurance institution
created by national law to provide old-age security but also in all probability the first
0 A.B. 1913; J.D. 1915; Ph.D. 1921, University of California. Professor of Law, University of Cali-
fornia. Consultant (on Unemployment and Old-Age Insurance) to Committee on Economic Security, 1934;
Executive Secretary, California Social Insurance Commission, 1915-1919; Member-of-Faculty-ofEconomics
and Law Departments, University of California, i919 to 1926; Member of Law Department since 1926.
Author of Insuring the Essentials (Macmillan Company, 1932). Contributor to legal periodicals, Encyclo-
pedia of Social Sciences, Survey, Political Science Annals, National Municipal Review, etc.
13 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 14 (833).
'For a discussion of these measures, see U. S. COMM'R OF LABOR, 24TH ANN. Rap. (i9o9) 83, 503, 863.
"Id. 413, 524, 532, 881, 889, 1396-99, 2001-2004.
'See U. S. CoMM'R OF LABOR, 4TH SPEc. REP. (1893).
"For the text of this act as originally enacted, see 19 IsAmERT, RECTEIL DEs ANcIENNES Lols FRAN-
cpasF (x822-33) 118.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
instance, of any branch of social insurance being put on a statutory compulsory basis.
Widespread legislative interest, however, in systematic provision of annuities even
for special groups of workers dates well along in the late nineteenth century.
The first compulsory annuity scheme applying to industrial workers was set up
in 18891'by the usual pioneering social insurance country-Germany. As in the case
of the earlier sickness and industrial accident insurance provision, the main features
of the German system were patterned after those of the ancient mining funds.
Annuities were payable in the case of either invalidity or old age. The former was
defined as loss of more than two-thirds earning capacity and the'latter as arrival at
the age of seventy.7 The insured workers and the employers were required to share
the premiums needed for financing the benefits. Premiums varied with the wage
level of the worker and annuities were adjusted both to the size and number of
premiums paid. In addition, the government bore part of the financial burden of
the scheme by granting an annual supplement to each annuity paid.,
This German program rested on the simple assumption that, since most workers
did not, or could not, accumulate surplus enough to maintain them in their old age,
the building of an annuity fund by systematic contributions from wage earners and
their employers should be required. Thus not only would the individual worker
be assured a "backlog" of income towards the end of his life but also the community
would be protected from a serious old-age dependency problem.
Shortly after the establishing of this compulsory annuity program by Germany,
other countries attacked the problem of old-age security in two other ways. One,
like the German, was a "contributory annuity" program to provide pensions payable
as a right and not conditioned on need. It involved, however, the inducing rather
than the compelling of contributions. Belgium (I89I), France (1895), Italy (1898),
Spain (19o8) experimented with plans9 involving public subsidies to individual
annuities voluntarily purchased from the government. The subsidies offered in the
Belgian and Italian schemes constituted one-half or more of the total cost of the
annuities piovided, while those of France and Spain were markedly smaller and the
effectiveness of the subsidies in inducing purchase of annuities varied, of course,
directly with their size.Y0 Aside from the inevitable objection to their cost, the chief
adverse criticism directed at these "subsidy" schemes was that small landowners and
the lower bourgeoisie constituted the bulk of the annuitants, whereas the industrial
workers who were most apt to arrive at old age penniless were not reached in
substantial numbers.
'For a full description of the original act, see U. S. COMM'R OF LABOR, 24Tu ANN. REP. 1356-1404.
For a complete translation of the 1911 Revised Social Insurance Code, see U. S. BUR. oF LABOR STAT. BULL.
96 (i9i) (Employes' Insurance); cf. BULL. 107 (1912). Insurance of manuals and non-manuals v,
provided in two separate systems.
'U. S. But. OF LABOR STAT. BULL. 96 (x91z) Articles 1255-1257.
'Id., Articles 1387-1391.
'U. S. COMM'R OF LABOR, 24TH ANN. REP. 503-504, 510-5ii, 836-837, 858-861, 1875-1885, 2362, 2372.
" Id., pp. 505, 861, 870-871, 1894; also ANNUAU o STATISTICO ITALIENo ANN. 1915, pp. 27, 279.
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Much more significant in growth than the voluntary subsidized technique, was
the other type of old-age provision, involving gratuitous pensions. This became for
twenty years or so a serious competitor to the German compulsory contributory
annuity plan. Denmark was the pioneer in this instance, establishing in i89Ill a
system of government money grants for meritorious citizens who arrived at old age
without a competence. These grants or "pensions" were completely differentiated
from poor relief and were intended to carry no stigma.' 2 The philosophy underly-
ing this type of provision was in marked contrast with the pragmatic assumptions on
which was rested the contributory insurance scheme adopted by Germany. The
latter merely accepted, without moralizing, the fact of wide prevalence of old-age
dependency, the practical impossibility of relying upon individual effort for the
control of such dependency and the effectiveness of a socially-controlled compulsory
contributory annuity plan as a method of attack upon the problem.
The Danish pension scheme, on the other hand, was based upon the conviction
that those who had been good citizens and independent self-respecting workers had
made a valuable contribution to their community and were entitled in return to
help from the public funds, if they could not maintain themselves in old age. In
short, the Danish program was directed at the "worthy" aged who were in distress,
with perhaps the belief that the incentive of old-age security would induce the
citizenry to eschew undeserving ways of living. The" grant or pension was adjusted
to the need of the pensioner, the government offer being in the nature of surety to
guarantee the deserving aged citizen's income should his own means fail.' 3 The
so-called "moral" qualifications were numerous and severe and reflected the convic-
tion of the period that only the undeserving and undesirables had to seek public aid
during their vigorous working years. The applicant had to prove not only that he
had neither been convicted of crime (unless pardoned), nor been guilty of "vagrancy,
mendicancy or living in such a way as to offend public morality" but also that he had
not within ten years received poor relief assistance.' 4
The communal authorities were allowed to determine the amount of the pension
in each case and were reimbursed by the Danish Exchequer to the extent of one-half
of their expenditures for old-age support.' 5 Dependency upon children was not
forced, although actual provision willingly made for parents was treated as income
in judging the applicant's need.16
,Denmark's first disciple was a British colony in the antipodes, New Zealand.
The basic principles of the Danish plan were accepted in the New Zealand scheme
'U. S. C6dn'R OF LAo, 24TH ANN. REP., 624.
"Id., 623, 633. The title of the act read "Law of April 189i concerning old age support for the
worthy poor, aside from poor relief." Civil rights were lost with the acceptance of poor relief but not,
however, for drawing of pensions. Different offices administered the two kinds of assistance. For a digest
of the act, see ANNUAIRE DE LEGIsLrToN ET ANoRE (189) 787-788.
U. S. COm'R OF LABOR, 24TH ANN. RaP. 626.
lId. 625. 'Id. 632. "Id. 628-629.
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which was legislated in 1898.17 Criminal offenders, family deserters and other per-
sons of bad moral character were disqualified. The size of the pension, however,
while adjusted to the applicant's need as in Denmark, was dictated by the terms of
the statute in the New Zealand scheme rather than left to the discretion of the
administrative authorities. Two Australian states enacted similar measures in I9o118
which functioned until a federal pension act, effective in all the Australian states was
passed by the Commonwealth of Australia in i9o8.19 France meanwhile had enacted
a gratuitous pension measure in 1905.20
The acceptance of this type of old-age security, moreover, by Great Britain in her
enactment of 19o821 which provided non-contributory pensions for the "aged and
deserving poor" -added a nation of major industrial importance. This not only
affected the choice of old-age security provision in Canada,22 Newfoundland 28 and
South Africa,24 but also markedly iufluenced thought in this country with respect to
old-age dependency problems.
Experience revealed certain significant weaknesses in this, the gratuitous pension,
type of old-age security provision. First, and perhaps most important, by adjusting
the pension to the needs of the pensioner, it put a premium not upon self-help but
upon the opposite. The more the applicant had, the less he received from the govern-
ment and vice versa. Thus the scheme was basically at war with the fundamental
principle of contemporary life, which demands that each individual make every
effort to accumulate for his own self-maintenance. Attempts were made to meet this
difficulty by amendments which exempted certain amounts of savings or income in
pension computations. Thus after less than a decade of experience the Danish Act
was amended to permit income up to ioo kroner per year to be disregarded in judg-
ing the applicant's need for a pension.25 This provision was periodically revised and
liberalized. Similar "exemptions" of stipulated sums were included in other pension
schemes and they too were liberalized by subsequent amendments, in an endeavor
to meet the generally expressed objection that thriftlessness was promoted by the
gratuitous pension plan.20
A second important limitation of the gratuitous pension plan revealed by expe-
rience, was the practical difficulty of enforcing its moral qualification clauses. Admin-
istrators sitting in judgment .on the aged and dependent applicants found that the
theory of aid only to the deserving and worthy, however justified on moral grounds,
was a distasteful one to put into practice. Strong public seniiment developed against
2eNew Zealand Stat. 1898, No. 14.
'
5 New South Wales and Victoria. "Australia Stat. x9o8, No. 17.
'This was frankly aid' for the indigerxt (institutional and non-institutional), not "reward for the
worthy." For a description of its terms, see U. S. COMM'R OF LABOR, 24TH ANN. -REP. 919-923.
27 Ed. VII, C. 40 (1908). 'Canada Stat. 1927, c. 156.
'Newfoundland Stat. 1911, c. XXIX; CoNs. SrAT. (x9x6) c. 74.
"Union of South Africa Stat. 1928, No. 22. " U. S. COMM' OF LABOR, 24THx ANN. Rn'. 626.
" The increases were, of course, partly in deference to changes in purchasing power of money. See
New Zealand Stat. 1913, No. 1o, §5; 1924, No: 34, §4; Australia Stat.'x9o8, No. 17, §24; 1916, NO. 32,
§3 (a); Great Britain, i & 2 Geo. V, c. 16, §2 (c) (igi); 9 & io Geo. V, c. 102, §4 (1919); 14 & 15
Geo. V, C. 33, §1 (1924).
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the penalizing of people at a time when they were old and helpless. This was re-
flected by the provisions of the later measures and amendments which repeatedly
modified and softened the "moral qualifications" requirement .2  In result the
schemes began to lose their original complexion of special provision for the old age
of meritorious citizens and to take on an aspect of systematic general provision for
necessitous old persons. The burden to the public funds mounted steadily as the
percentage of eligible population granted pensions increased year by year. These
facts, together with the distaste which the self-respecting old person felt at having to
prove need by submitting to an investigation which inevitably smacked of poor relief
procedure, combined to develop a sentiment against this method of attacking the
problem of old-age security.
The insurance or annuity technique offered several practical advantages as com-
pared with the gratuitous pension plan. By requiring systematic contributions
during working years, it eased the burden on the general tax receipts. By producing
an annuity to which the insured worker was entitled as a right, it removed ,the
pension from any possible connection with poor relief. Since the wage earners were
required to participate in the scheme, whether they were deserving or undeserving
could not be a proper subject of inquiry28 in their period of old age. This made for
a more inclusive and, since unworthy as well as worthy old people must be fed,
clothed and housed, a more satisfactory remedial program.
In consequence an increasing number of countries adopted the contributory
annuity plan. France, 29  Luxemburg,30  Roumania,31  the Netherlands32  and
Sweden s 3 had enacted compulsory old-age insurance measures before the outbreak
of the World War. Between 1918 and 193o moreover,. thirteen additional European34
countries, Great Britain among them, had taken a similar step as had several of the
Latin American countries. There was also a series of special eriactments for selected
industrial groups.38 Practically all of the measures provided for invalidity as well
as for old age. During this period only Canada,36 South Africa," Norway 3s and
Compare Section 17 of Australia's act, supra note 19, with the "moral qualifications" clause in the
New Zealand.Act, supra note 17. The Newfoundland Act, supra note 23, had no "moral qualification"
clauses. For Great Britain's gradual release of the "moral qualification" clauses, see I & 2 Geo. V, c. 16,
§4 (sgsi); 9 & 1o Geo. V, c. 102, §3 (i959). Also compare Denmark's qualification clause in her 1927
Statute, INT. LaBoR OFFICE LEGIs. SERIES 1927, Denmark 2, §2-13, with that included in her original act,
and discussed supra, p. 177.
'eBut see Danish X933 Invalidity Insurance Law, infra note 40.
'For an analysis, see BULLETIN DU MIsIS-rERE Du TRAvAIL 1910, p. 384; for translation, INT. LABOR
OFFICE, 5 BULL. (1910) 36x-375.
'INT. LABOR OFFICE, 6 BULL. (1911) cxxvi-cxxxvii. 8 id. (1913) xxx-xxxv.
29 id. (94) cxx. Operation of this act was deferred until 1923. See INT. LABOR OFFICE, LEGIs.
SERIES 1923, Netherlands 6. 'INT. LABOR OFFICE, 9 BULL. (1.914) 191-203.
'Austria (1925), Belgium (924), Bulgaria (1924), Czechoslovakia (1924), Great Britain (X925),
Greece (1924),. Hungary (x929), Italy (i959), Poland (I928);,for commercial employees only, Portugal
(g99), Spain (i959), Russia (592i), Yugoslavia (1922), CMile (924), Argentina (i921) (operation
suspended) (for citations to the foregoing laws and their chief amendments and description of their subject'
matter, see ARMSTRONG, INSURING TnE ESSENTIALS (932) App. Chart VIII).
'Bolivia (1926) (bank employees); Brazil (1921) (railroad workers); Cuba (1923) (railroad
workers), (1927) (maritime workers). 'Canada Stat. 1927, C. 156.
'Union of South Africa Stat. 1928, No. 22. 'mN,. LABOR OFFICE, LEoIs. SERIES 1923, No. z.
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Uruguay89 had enacted gratuitous pension laws and that of Norway was and still
is non-operative.
Since i93o, interest in- compulsory annuity provision has continued to gain mo-
mentum and a change in opinion is evident in even the pioneer gratuitous pension
countries. Denmark, While still granting non-contributory old-age pensions, since
1933 makes them available only to those who comply with the new rules compelling
sickness and invalidity insurance.40
New Zealand in 1935 appointed a government departmental committee which has
recently reported and recommended that New Zealand adopt a "National Com-
pulsory Superannuation and Health Insurance" scheme.4' The suggested plan fol-
lows the conventional pattern. Under its terms wage earners and salaried employees
up to a certain income level would be required to insure and participation on a
voluntary basis would be open to better-paid employees and to farmers, merchants
and professional men.
All of the old-age insurance schemes of general application, except those of
Sweden, Belgium and Chile, and, to a very limited extent, Great Britain,42 confine
their compulsory provisions to wage earners. This has been done for purely adminis-
trative reasons. Employers are used as collecting agencies for the government,
through whom the insured workers are reached. The enforcement problems of the
poll tax are involved in the attempt to compel contributions from self-employed
persons whose need for old-age security is, of course, not to be differentiated from
that of persons Who are employed by others.
Swedeh braved the administrative dangers of "popular" coverage and in her 1913
measure required the insurance of all persons between the ages of sixteen and sixty-
five unless they were working in an occupation for which old-age pensions were
already required. Contributions or premiums varied directly with income and were
payable to the tax-collecting agencies. Municipalities were held responsible for un-
paid contributions and delinquencies brought serious problems to local authorities.
Experience indicated an average of fifteen percent- of unpaid premiums which rose
as high as forty to fifty percent in certain industrial districts. This has caused serious
questioning in Sweden of the advisability of her coverage arrangements. 48
T Id., Uruguay 2.
'By a law enacted in 1933, only those who insure against sickness and invalidity (and all physically
able to gain membership in sickness funds were required thereafter to insure) or are unable, for physical
reasons, to qualify for such insurance, are eligible for old-age pensions. The full cost of old-age pensions
is still met out of the public funds and the same moral and "needs" qualifications arc retained. Further-
more, these same qualifying provisions now also apply to the contributory invalidity insurance pensions.
For a full description of this hybrid scheme, see I'r. LaoR OFFIcE, 47 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOUR INFoRMA-
-ON (933) 278-9, 306-309.
"See 57 id., (1936) 17-20, for a summary of the plan proposed.
"Great Britain's scheme, since 1928, has included certain manual workers who in legal theory are
independent contractors, not, employees. For purposes of insurance they are deemed employees of the
persons for whom they perform personal services, i.e., the customers, and the latter have the responsibility
of employers. This inclusion covers such workers as timber fellers, hay cutters, hedgers, brick makers,
etc., who contract for "jobs." See 18 & 19 Geo. V, c. 14, §201 (1928).
"See Liedstrand, Socidal Insurance in Sweden (1924) 9 INT. LtAoR REv., 177, at 179 ct seq.
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Belgium and Chile, in addition to requiring their wage earners to insure, in-
cluded self-employed workers whose earnings approximated that of industrial
workers. To what extent this additional coverage has been effective is not of record.
Great Britain's extension of compulsory coverage to manual independent con-
tractors handled administratively through the device of treating their customers as
employers, was attempted only after more than twenty-five years of social insurance
experience, when a substantial degree of conformity with insurance obligations was
normal. Thus managed, the additional inclusion presents no greater enforcement
difficulties than are involved in the insurance of domestic servants in private homes.
Survey of the twenty-odd contributory annuity plans4" reveals considerable varia-
tion in detail but marked similarity in general pattern. Most systems limit the com-
pulsion in the case at least of the non-manual workers, to persons earning less than
a stipulated annual amount. This amount is set at a figure considered high enough
to include all those persons who remain dependent upon their earnings throughout
their lives. Almost without exception the insurance scheme is open on a voluntary
basis to highly paid employees who are exempted from compulsory insurance and to
independent workers, small merchants and other persons of moderate income. The
majority now include both agricultural workers and domestics, although workers in
these employments are still excepted in some countries which have recently set up
their social insurance schemes. Special enforcement problems have caused a fre-
quent deferring of the protection of farm labor and domestic service until the social
insurance obligations have become normal accepted incidents of employment
contracts.
In three-fourths of the schemes both employers and the insured workers45 con-
tribute regular shares of the premium due and the state exchequer shares in the
financing in most instances, by adding a supplement to the pensions produced by
the premiums. Sixty-five is the most usual age at which annuities become payable,
sixty and seventy being the minimum and maximum age limits set in any of the
plans.4 6
The amount of annuity is consistently small even in the light of the standard and
cost of living of the country. The pension is obviously intended to furnish only a
minimum subsistence, and some suppleme£tary income is clearly contemplated as
normal. The pension varies in almost all bf the systems47 with the wage level of
the worker and with the length of his contribution period. A minimum amount,
however, is usually included, which protects to a certain extent the man of very
low earning capacity.
"For detailed information the reader is referred to ARMsroNo, INSURING THE EssEaIA.s (1932) APP.
Chart VIII, where the coverage, financing, benefits, etc., of each act are set forth.
'The worker is not required to contribute in Spain, Holland and Russia. The employer contributes
nothing in Sweden. The worker often does contribute both in Spain and Holland, and it is contemplated
that he shall in order to get a substantial annuity as the amount othetwise is very small.
Several of the schemes, however, set a lower age limit for women workers than for insured men.
'
T Great Britain is a conspicuous exception. Her contributory annuity, like all her social insurance
benefits, is a flat rate for all insured workers, without regard to their wage level.
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The provision for invalidity is less generous in most cases than that made for old
age. Even the usual definition of invalidity is a harsh one. Most of the schemes
require that the manual worker suffer a reduction of earning capacity of two-thirds
or more than two-thirds, although non-manuals are frequently allowed to qualify
for an invalidity pension on permanent loss of earning capacity of more than fifty
percent. The severity of the qualification clause for manuals is related to the ever-
present fear, not wholly unjustified, that invalidity insurance will be imposed upon
by older workers who are not really invalided but find it difficult to obtain employ-
ment in competition with younger men. If in administration of the insurance a
liberal appraisal of the worker's physical disability is made where actual invalidity is
present and strict compliance with the qualification clause is used only where im-
position is believed to be present, the definition justifies itself. Obviously invalidity
inturance cannot remain solvent if used as a species of unemployment insurance.
Placing too high a retirement age, of course, compounds administrative difficulties
in connection with invalidity insurance, as the worker who has reached "economic
old age," i.e., the period when he can no longer hope to have regulir work, yet
cannot draw his annuity and so lacks regular income, will rapidly deteriorate
physically.
Special "transitional provisions" directed at more adequate annuities for those
workers who were past middle age when the insurance scheme began to function,
than could be produced by their contributions, were included in all of the measures.
This was done for the obvious reason that, due to the date of adoption of the system,
the older workers were placed at great disadvantage as compared with the younger.
'Below is indicated a table,48 showing the relative size of old-age and invalidity
pensions for eight selected countries. It has been assumed in preparing the table
that the pensioner has a dependent wife of pensionable age, but no dependent children.
In addition to showing the actual amount of pensions in the foreign currencies, to
facilitate comparison by the American reader, the pension is stated in each case as a
percentage of the laborer's wage in the country concerned.
It may be noted that the Dutch pension is a particularly small one. This is due
to the fact that no worker's contribution is actually required. The worker con-
tributes to the extent that he desires to add to this basic pension.
The most significant post-war enactment was that of Great Britain's contributory
annuity plan in I925,49 after seventeen years' experience with gratuitous pensions for
the "aged and deserving poor." A very important aspect of this shift lay in the fact
that the gratuitous pensionh plan denuded of its "moral qualifications" clause was
retained not just for the tiansitional period of launching the annuity program but as
' Adapted from a table in ARnsTMONG, INSURING Tim EssNTjALs (1932) 417.
'This added complete survivors' insurance as well as old-age insurance. See 15 & x6 Geo. V, c. 70
(1925).
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CALCULATED WEEKLY OLD-AGE AND INVALIDITY PENSIONS FOR VARIOUS COUNTRIES
IN RELATION TO WEEKLY WAGES IN THOSE COUNTRIES*
Weekly Old-Age Invalidity Invalidity
Old-Age Invalidity Invalidity Wages Pension Pension at Pension at
Country Unit Pensionf Pension at Pension at Unskilled As a Sa a 40 as
(Weekly) Age 55 Age 40 Labor in Percent Percent Percent
(Weekly) (Weekly) Engineering of Wages of Wages of Wages
Trades
Belgium .......... francs ....... 61.5 ..... ..... 145.80 42.1 ....
Czechoslovakia .... crowns ...... 87.50 74.04 35.85 170.26 51.4 43.4 31.6
France ........... francs ....... 72.00 72.00 72.00 153.21 47.0 47.0 47.0
Germany ......... marks ....... 12.15 10.62 8.02 34.89 34.8 30.4 23.0
Great Britain ..... shillings and
pence...... 20/0 7/6 7/6 44/2 45.3 17.0 17.0
Hungary ......... pengos ...... 13.16 10.99 7.74 23.52 56.2 47.0 32.9
Ital ............ lire ......... 58.14 49.83 37.56 121.88 47.7 40.9 30.8
Neterlands. florins ....... 6.12 5.43 4.50 25.31 24.2 21.5 17.8
*The pensions have been calculated for a worker whose average wage during the whole period involved is equal to or fall a
within the same wage class as the average weekly wage paid to unskilled laborers in the engineering trades.
tCalculated for a worker and his wife at the age at which the benefits begin.
a permanent supplement to the contributory scheme. This was in recognition of the
fact that the contributory program could not guarantee the entire population an
income in old age. In fact, while it would do so for the great majority of persons
whose income came from their labor rather than from property, it would not com-
pletely cover even this group. This was due to the fact that for administrative
reasons already mentioned, it only reached the workers who spent their lives as wage
earners in the employ of others and thus offered no protection to persons who, while
equally dependent upon earnings, were self-employed.50 Moreover it was accepted
as inevitable that a certain proportion of persons from high income groups would,
through business losses or unfortunate investments, come to financial grief in their
old age.
The contributory annuity plan was set up and clearly designed to be the standard
old-age security device which in time would carry the major load and the gratuitous
pension program was retained to provide for the minor group who fell outside the
annuity scheme and who arrived at old age without subsistence income.
It was arranged that the premiums charged for the contributory annuities which
were divided between the insured workers and their employers should be gradually
stepped up over a long period of time.51 They were calculated at an amount which,
at their maximum, would, if placed at interest at four percent, furnish the promised
6' See note 42, supra.
'For a full explanation of the technical basis of the scheme, including actuarial forecasts, etc., see
(1926) 13 INT. LA oR RFV. 361-381, 5o6-522. The continental schemes in contrast have been placed, at
least in theory, chiefly upon a "reserve" or "accumulation" basis. It is generally believed, however, that
contributions in all countries are concededly inadequate for straight "capitalization" of premiums. See in
this connection, TRAtNsAc'rONs OF 9TH INT. CONG. OF Ac-ruAmus, Vol. 111 (1930) (papers on old age in-
surance in various countries). E.g., K. Lindner, actuarial adviser of the State Insurance Bank at Amster-
dam, says (id. at p. 475) "It is a notable fact, that so far as I am aware, in state pension schemes no
attempt has ever been made to provide capital sufficient to cover any future requirements."
Germany's reserves were completely wiped out during the inflation period 1921-1924. For ten years
thereafter, the scheme was frankly upon a straight assessment basis. "Reformation," effective from 1934,
is directed at putting the scheme, as rapidly as economic conditions will permit, on a reserve basis. For
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annuities for the workers who contributed them. Instead, however, of placing them
at interest, the government planned, while retaining a reserve plan on paper for
guidance, to pay the current annuities out of current premiums. The government
was pledged to supply in return for this, by future annual grant as needed, what
was lost to the Pension Fund by not capitalizing the contributions.
• The advantages of this technique are fiscal. It obviates the accumulation of large
reserves with their attendant investment problems. It entails no sacrifice of safety as
would a private venture proceeding on such a basis, since the social insurance pro-
gram involves an entirely different situation. The private concern has no absolute
assurance of a future. It'may not be able to attract policy holders. The age distribu-
tion of the policy holders which it does secure is not assured. It must, to secure its
ability to make good its promises to those who insure with it, build up out of the
investment of the premiums, reserves from which the annuities can and will be paid.
The social insurance program on the other hand has an assured future of constantly
added policy holders who have no choice about insurance. Their age distribution
is equally predictable and it will be "favorable" since they will be the workers of
society. The future resources and obligations of the scheme thus can be forecast, and
the stability of the government and its taxing power stand back of the government's
promise to make good by future grant as needed what is lost by non-capitalization
of the premiums.
The British program, in short, is based on a complete understanding of social
insurance as distinguished from private commercial insurance, and Great Britain has
adjusted a safe, orderly annuity scheme to what it deems to be the soundest principles
of general government finance.
It should be remarked in making passing reference to the old-age assistance plans
adopted in the United States during the late twenties, 52 that these state laws differed
in a vital respect from the gratuitous pension provisions of other countries. They all,
without exception, granted assistance to the needy old person only when he did not
have a spouse or children (or, in many cases, other listed relatives such as sisters and
brothers) who were able to support him. The foreign measures, in contrast, judged
the applicant on the basis of his own financial situation without forcing his depend-
ence upon his children.
The American measures thus definitely were a mere variety of poor relief and
the assistance grants did not deserve the term "pensions" which certain of the states
have, applied to them. Their chief contribution was that they marked a definite step
away from the neglect of the aged which characterized the shameful almshouse era
a full discussion of technical basis of present scheme and projected plans, see 21 INT. LABOR Rav. (March,
April, October, 1935) 398-418, 539-554, and 22 id. 515-522.
The French system is, professedly at least, dominantly a "reserve" rather than "pay-as-you-go" scheme.
Guarantee of a minimum pension, however, .and confessedly inadequate premiums make a state subsidy
implicit if pension claims are to be met. For complete explanation of the actuarial basis of the French
scheme, see Mowbray, The New French Social Insurance Law, 17 PROCEEDINOS OF THE CAsuALTY AcT .Lt.
SOCIETY (193x)-241-263.
"
2For a graphic analysis of these laws, see 39 U. S. MONEnsy LABOR REV. 255; 41 id. 303.
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from which this country has so lately emerged. The efforts made to secure the
passage of these measures, moreover, educated the citizenry both to the existence of
a serious old-age dependency problem and to the need of systematic provision of
old-age security other'than enforced institutionaL care.53
In summary it may be stated that in the course of the half century that has
elapsed since Germany launched the first compulsory annuity program for industrial
workers, various methods of attacking the problem of old-age dependency have been
tried. *The two techniques for achieving old-age security which have received major
attention are contributory annuities and gratuitous pensions for needy ;nd deserving
aged. Resting as they do upon different philosophical bases, for a long period these
were deemed mutually exclusive remedial programs between which countries should
choose. The gratuitous pension plan, for the "worthy poor," for twenty years or s6
attracted more interest perhaps than old-age insurance, voluntary or compulsory.54
Experience with such provision, however, convinced most countries that in practical
operation it tended to become relief for the needy rather than' reward for the
worthy and that, as such, it was both a more costly and a less satisfactory old-age
security device than a contributory annuity program. The latter, by putting pro-
vision for old age on a business-like basis of steady building during working years
of annuity rights in old age, removed pensions altogether from the undesirable
sphere of poor relief. Since, moreover, the annuity was not conditioned upon "need,"
the *orker derived the full advantage of any savings he was able to accumulate.
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Thus self-help was promoted, not discouraged. The contributions from the insured
workers and their employers, which furnished the major part of the funds needed
for the annuities, relieved the general treasury of substantial burden.
The limiting of compulsory insurance to wage earners, for persuasive administra-
tive reasons has had almost universal approval and for similar reasons coverage of
certain groups has been deferred in some cases and has been provided for in a
special separate scheme in others. The undesirability of omitting from the scheme
self-employed workers of earning capacity similar to that of the insured group has
been universally recognized. Their voluntary participation in the annfiity scheme
has been encouraged and in one country of major importance, Great Britain, some
of the manual self-employed now are included in the compulsory system by an in-
genious administrative device. Lastly it has become increasingly apparent abroad
that the supplementing of the contributory insurance arrangements, compulsory and
voluntary, by a gratuitous pension plan to provide for those who arrive at old age
without either private means or an annuity, is essential to a rounded-out program
of old-age security.
nFor an excellent picture of this problem, see RuBlNow, THE QUEsT FOR SECURITY (1934) CS. XVIII-
XXIII, inclusive. It should be noted that under Arizona's law, Stat. 1933, C. 34, the income and property
of the spouse only-and not that of the children of the applicant-is pertinent.
" See id., c. XXIV, for an interesting comparision of "straight pensions" and "contributory annuities";
and see ARmsTRoNG, INSURING THE ESSENTIALS (1932) 431-2.
'It should be remarked, however, that the state subsidy is not paid to the lxnsioner of high income
under the laws of Czechoslovakia, INT. LAB R OFFcE, LEoIS. SEmaS 1928, CZ. 2, 5I23 (4); Luxemburg.
(non-manual workers), id., 1931, Lux. 2, §S6 (d); and Sweden, id., i92i, Swe. 2, S14.
